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Prof-r Hathaway has taught international human rights law since 
1984, and regularly advises both gwernments and advocaqvgroups 
around the world. He has pioneered efforts to link refugee imv to 
international human rights law, and is presently completing a treatise 
mtitkd The Rights of Refugees Under International Law. Lust spring he 
wwened the Fint CoUoquium on Challenges in International Refugee 
h, bringing international experts to the Law School to collaborate with 
studintr in pmducing recom&tions to respond to the inmeasleaslng 
tmdency of'givvemmettts to q u i r e  would-be refugees to accept rerehtive 
sa#dy within their own countrk, instead of seeking asylum. The mult of 
their d e l i b e r a w  "Michigan Guidelines on the Internal Protection 
AltemaW (see stmy on page 30), has b m  dissemikted to some 
5m *gee judges, policym& and advocates. 
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It has often struck me that the prominence of the 
Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States epitomizes the plight of international 
law in this country. The title of this standard 
reference on international law does not even refer to 
international law, but instead to foreign relations law. 
That is, it is meant to set out the standards by which 
we may legitimately judge the conduct of others. The 
clear, if unintended, message is that the Restatement 
is not really a codification of laws that bind us. And 
indeed, it is explicitly not just a codification, but a re- 
statement. It is, in other words, not a simple 
summation of those rules that are binding under 
international standards of lawmaking, but a 
specifically American take on the rules that (ought 
to?) define the global order. 
This detachment from an understanding of 
international law as a collectively defined system that 
binds all states is most clearly evident in our troubled 
relationship with international human rights law. 
While the United States has been involved in the 
drafting of every major human rights treaty, is 
represented at virtually every session of every human 
rights monitoring body, and annually publishes its 
assessment of the human rights performance of every 
country in the world, we simply do not accept that 
international human rights law is about us. We 
cannot bring ourselves as a nation to adopt 
international human rights standards as domestically 
binding norms, and we certainly will not tolerate other 
states or international bodies scrutinizing the ways in 
which human rights are (or are not) implemented in 
the United States. 
My own field of refugee law is rife with examples 
of American refusal to be part of the international 
human rights project. The courts routinely insist that 
relevant domestic law implements our obligations 
under international refugee law. But they seem 
simultaneously determined to interpret our treaty 
obligations in ways that diverge from the goals of the 
Refugee Protocol, and which bear little resemblance 
to interpretations of the same obligations rendered by 
courts in our partner states. The United States stands 
alone in its insistence that refugees are to be denied 
protection unless somehow able to prove the state of 
mind of the person or entity that would persecute 
them; specifically, we require evidence that the 
actions of the agent of persecution are inspired by 
racial, political, or other animosity. No other country 
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demands such feats of clairvoyance. Similarly, while 
most developed countries have formally committed 
themselves to judge the existence of a risk of 
persecution by whether or not basic international 
human rights are respected in the asylum seeker's 
home country, American judges only rarely show any 
awareness of these standards. Instead, our courts are 
typically content subjectively to decide whether the 
harm threatened is "regarded as offensive." And even 
when an individual somehow meets the peculiarly 
American standard of international refugee status, 
this is no guarantee of protection. Instead, we assert 
that asylum is a matter of discretion, rather than 
entitlement, and, unique among Western states, we 
explicitly reserve the right forcibly to interdict any 
refugees approaching our borders, even i f  this means 
taking action in international waters beyond our 
legal authority. 
Even with all these concerns, our record on 
respect for international refugee law is actually one of 
the relative success stories in America's relationship 
to international human rights law. At least with 
refugee law we have signed the relevant treaty, and 
acknowledge that our asylum law is (more or less) 
based on international standards. Until quite recently, 
we refused to be bound by any of the other major 
human rights treaties. And even now, we will not sign 
on without a reservation to guarantee that 
international norms cannot override the U.S. 
Constitution (logically raising the question of just why 
we accede to human rights treaties at all). 
Perhaps most tragically, the United States 
steadfastly refuses to allow its own citizens to hold i t  
directly accountable through the United Nations 
complaint procedures established to address even 
such presumably uncontroversial rights as freedom 
from torture, racial discrimination, and the violation 
of basic civil and political rights. Among the 
industrialized countries that comprise the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, only the citizens of the United States, 
Japan, Korea, and Mexico are prevented from 
accessing the United Nations. Even Algeria, China, 
and Libya have agreed that their citizens will have 
the right to take human rights concerns directly to the 
UN. Our contempt for international accountability is 
clear too in the outrage expressed by some political 
leaders when the United Nations Special Rapporteur 
on Summary Executions not only decided to visit the 
United States last year, but dared to criticize our 
refusal ro a ~ o l l s h  laws that authorize the execut~on or 
children (only Thailand has taken a position 
comparable to that of the United States). 
We can, of course, credibly argue that there is 
less need for international involvement in human 
rights enforcement in the United States than in many 
other, much more troubled, countries. And we can 
always fall back on the tired old chestnut of domestic 
constitutional supremacy to insist that it would not be 
legally responsible for the United States to be a full 
participant in the international human rights system. 
But these are lame excuses for keeping our distance 
from international human rights law. Many other 
countries with excellent human rights records are 
quite willing to embrace international accountability. 
And few of their constitutions are as clear in defining 
an authoritative role for international law as is our 
own Article VI, which expressly defines treaties to be 
part of "the supreme Law of the Land," which shall 
bind judges "... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws 
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." 
My own sense is that the real reason the United 
States rejects international human rights law is an 
intuitive belief that our own, domestically framed, 
human rights values are better than anything the 
world has to offer us. We just do not want to see our 
definitions of rights interfered with by non-Americans. 
Yet the truth is that access to the international 
human rights machinery would not allow the United 
Nations to overrule American law. There is a solid 
tradition within UN treaty bodies of deference to 
reasonable national interpretations of human rights, 
and, in any event, no United Nations human rights 
body can issue enforceable judgments. The United 
States would, however, be required to defend the 
treatment of persons under its authority before expert 
bodies elected by the governments of the world 
(including the United States). We would be denied the 
right simply to assert the domestic legality of a 
particular practice, and would occasionally have to 
face up to the logic of reconsidering our traditional 
views. 
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Experience elsewhere suggests that the rejection 
of a cosmopolitan approach to human rights is a 
substantive loss for American society. Complaints to 
international human rights bodies have opened the 
eyes of Canada to flaws in its protection of aboriginal 
peoples, of the Netherlands to patterns of sex 
discrimination, and of Switzerland to official conduct 
that gave rise to the risk of torture. American national 
human rights law is similarly in need of a mechanism 
that tests our accepted beliefs against the views of 
the broader global community. Is there no room for 
doubt about the sufficiency of our strictly national 
approach to human rights when the Constitution is 
invoked to defend the right to inflame hatred through 
violent speech, to guarantee the right of every 
American to possess guns without demonstration of 
genuine need, and to treat foreign nationals routinely 
incarcerated at our borders as non-persons? Are we 
really confident that human rights are not infringed 
when we do little to combat the existence of a 
permanent economic underclass in the midst of the 
world's wealthiest nation? 
There are also compelling political reasons to 
accept the need for a continuing dialogue of 
justification about the scope of human rights law. 
Whatever concerns we had about the risks of 
international accountability during the Cold War era 
are now clearly irrelevant. In an era where virtually all 
wars are civil wars, fought on the basis of irrational 
prejudice or discriminatory allocations of power and 
resources, there is no excuse for our standoffish 
attitude towards an international legal system that 
works to defuse precisely those risks. I f  we continue 
to insist on the primacy of our own parochial way of 
defining rights and entitlements, we should not be 
surprised when others also reject accountability with 
predictably tragic results of the kind witnessed most 
recently in Kosovo. 
America must learn to lead by example. 
